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clearly the rule in Connecticut: Waite v. Pritchard, 19 Conn.
212.
The language of the court in The Bank of Montgomery v.
Reese, 2 Casey 147, certainly sustains this view of the proper
measure of damages, which is certainly applicable to a case like
the present, where the value is the highest at the time of trial.
The jury took the highest value of the stock just preceding the
trial, there being no later estimate submitted, and there is, there-
fore, no error under the charge of the court.
Judgment affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS-
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.'
SUPREIE COURT OF NEW YORK.4
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.
5
COURT OF APPEALS OF IKENTUCKY.8
ACCOUNT STATED.
Where a factor has transmitted to his principal accounts of two dif-
ferent. sales of the same goods, the principal, after having approved and
recognised the first account, is not bound to notice, or object to, the
second, at the peril of its being taken as a stated account, and held
binding upon him: C(rtwright et al. v. Greene et al., 47 Barb.
ADMIRALTY.
Prnctice-Depositions.--Depositions cannot be used o'n the trial of a
suit in admiralty, which were taken in another suit concerning the same
subject-matter: where the party against whom they are offered was not
a party to the suit in which they were taken, nor privy to any such
party, and had no right to cross-examine the witnesses: Rutherford v.
Gedetes, 4 Wallace.
rom J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 4 of his Reports.
2 r'om Charles Allen, E-.q., Reporter ; to appear in vol. 12 of his Reports.
' From the Judges of the court. The cases will appear in 46 or 47 N. H. Rep.
IFrom Hon. 0. L. Barbour , to appear in vol. 47 of his Reports.
nFrom W. G. Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 39 Vt. Reports.
0 From John L. Scott, Esq. The cases will appear in 2 or 3 Duval's Reports.
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Nor can depositions be read in admiralty any more than at common
law, without some sufficient reason being shown, why the witness was
not produced at the hearing: Id.
APPEAL.
Matters of Discretion.-An order directing that J. 0., late sheriff, be
made a party plaintiff, and that the summons, pleadings, &c., be amended
by inserting therein the name of the said J. 0., late sheriff, as a party
plaintiff; and permitting the plaintiff to give to said sheriff, nunc pro
tunc, the undertaking prescribed by section 238 of the Code, and to
amend the complaint by inserting an allegation of such delivery, pro-
vides for an amendment of the original complaint. Such order is there-
fore a matter of discretion, and is not appealable: ayre v. Frazer et
al., 47 Barb.
BANKS.
Taxation by States.-Shares in banks, whether state banks or those
organized under the Act of June 3d 1864, "to providd a national cur-
rency," &a., are liable to taxation by the state under certain limitations
(set forth in section forty-first of the act), without regard to the fact
that the capital of such banks is invested in bonds of the United States,
declared, by statutes creating them, to be exempted from taxation by or
under state authority: Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wallace 573,
affirmed: People v. The Commissioners, 4 Wallace.
If the rate of taxation by the state on such shares is the same as, or not
greater, than upon the moneyed capital of the individual citizen which
is subject or liable to taxation; that is to say, if no greater proportion
or percentage of tax on the valuation of the shares is levied than upon
other moneyed taxable capital in the hands-of its citizens, the shares
are taxed in conformity with that proviso of the'forty-first section, which
.says that they may be assessed, "1but not at a greater rate than is assessed
upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such
state :" Id.
Bms or EXCHANGE.
By what Law to be governed.-A bill of exchange, payable in the.
city of New York, is, although it be drawn and accepted in the state of
Indiana, a contract to be performed in New York, and is to be governed
by the laws of that state: Bright v. Judson, -47 Barb.
Bonw fide Eolder.-Aceepting a bill or note in payment of a pre-
cedent debt, is not parting with value, so as to make the holder a bond
fide holder for value: Id.
Where an antecedent debt is evidenced by negotiable paper, it is not
enough that new paper should have been received in payment and satis-
faction of the old. To entitle the holder of the new paper to recover
thereon, the old paper must be absolutely surrendered, before maturity,
to the person from whom he received the new paper: Id.
Acce ptace obtained by Fraud.-If the acceptance of a bill is obtained
by fraudulent representations, such fraud is a bar to a recovery upon the
bill by any person not a bondfide holder for value: Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Retrospective Acts.-A statute which simply authorizes the imposition
of a tax according to a previous assessment is not retrospective: Locke
v. New Orleans, 4 Wallace.
Every retrospective act is not necessarily an ex post facto law: Id.
Such laws embrace only such as impose or affect penalties or forfeit-
ures: 1d.
Oonstruction of Local Law by State Courts binding on Courts of the
United States -The Mexican Colonization Law of August 18th 1824,
though general to the Republic of *2lexico, was, so far as it affected lands
within the limits of Texas, after the independence of that country, a
local law of the new state, as much so as if it had originated in her
legislation. The interpretation, therefore, placed on it by the highest
court of the state, must be accepted as the true interpretation, so far as
it applies to titles to lands in that state, whatever may be the opinion of
this court of its original soundness. If in courts of other states carved
out of territory since acquired from Mexico, a different interpretation
has been adopted, the courts of the United States will follow the dif-
ferent ruling, so far as it affects titles in those states: Christy v. Prid-
geon, 4 Wallace.
The interpretation within the jurisdiction of a state, of a local law,
becomes a part of that law, as much so as if incorporated in the body
of it by the legislature. If different interpretations are given in different
states to a similar law, that law, in effect, becomes, by the interpreta-
tions, so far as it is a rule for action by this court, a different law in one
state from what it is in the other: Id.
Exemption of Lands from Taxation-Obligation of Contract by the
State.-Where a state in order to promote the drainage and sale of cer-
tain swamp lands belonging to it, and which it was desirous of reclaim-
ing, has passed, by way of encouraging purchasers, a law that such
lands "shall be exempt from taxation for the term of ten years," and
issued transferable scrip receivable for them, a repeal of the Exemption
Act, so far as it concerns lands paid for either before or after the repeal,
with scrip issued before the repeal, impairs a contract of the state with
the holders of such scrip v 11cGee v. Mathis, 4 Wallace.
CORPORATIONS.
Taxation by States.-The legislature have power, by a general law,
to require corporations organized here to pay to the treasurer of the
Commonwealth a tax upon the excess of the market value of all the
capital stock thereof over the value of their real estate and machinery
taxable in the city or town where they are situated; and the fact that
a corporation owns, as part of its personal property, bonds of the United
States, and that a portion of its stockholders live in other states of the
Union, will not exempt it from liability to pay the full amount of such
tax: Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manitfacturing Co., 12 Allen.
This doctrine applies to mining corporations: Id.
CRULIINAL LAW.
.Discharge on Habeas Corpus by reason of Writ of Error from a
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Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.-This court will not
discharge on habeas corpus a prisoner convicted of crime in the Superior
Court, and confined under sentence of imprisonment passed by that
court, although a writ of error addressed to that court has been issued
by a single justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, if no
questions of law in the case were ever brought by exceptions or other-
wise to this court for determination; but it will be assumed that the
writ was improvidently issued, and will be dismissed: Fleming v. Clark,
12 Allen.
Writ of Error from Supreme Court of the United States.-A writ of
error, duly and properly issued by a justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a criminal case which in final judgment and sentence
have been given by a court of this Commonwealth, will operate as a super-
sedeas and stay of execution; but, before discharging the prisoner on
habeas corpus in such a case, this court will require him to give suffi-
cient bail to abide the final judgment which may be ordered by the
Supreme Court of the United States: .Bryan v. Bates, 12 Allen.
Larceny.-An indictment for larceny in a shop is sustained by proof
that the defendant, with a- felonioug intent, obtained the property of
another in the shop, by falsely personating the owner: Commonwealth
v. Collins, 12 Allen.
DAMAGES.
Attaching-Officer-Trespass by, Owner.-The extent of damages
which the attaching-officer, who sues the real owner for a trespass in
unlawfully removing property from his attachment, may recover, is the
amount of debt, costs, and interest due upon the execution, which the
property was held to pay; and such trespasser not being a party to the
execution cannot, because the officer's fees on the execution were -not
seasonably indorsed by items, object to their allowance as part of the
-damages: Houston v. Howard, 39 Vt.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Sale of Chattels without Deliver -Levy by Credtors.-It is well
settled in this state that a sale or pledge of chattels, which from their
nature or situation it is not impracticable to move, will, if not accompa-
nied by a manifest and substantial change of possession, be voidable by
attaching-creditors: Houston v. Howard, 39 Vt.
The ostensible nature and purpose of a change of possession, as well
as its duration, should be considered in determining whether it was so
manifest and substantial as to be unprejudiced by a return of the pro-
perty to the control and possession of the original owner: Id.
In March R. delivered all his assets, including two wagons, to H., to
enable H. to realize out of their avails the payment of certain debts.
H. sells part of them and applies on his debts. In June thereafter he
allows the wagons to return to R.'s possession, although the debts were
not fully paid, H. believing that he could not lose any rights by so
doing. field, that the wagons, after, their return to R.'s hands and
while in his possession, are attachable as R.'s property: Id.
The attachment would not be less valid because H. bad been previ-
ously summoned as R.'s trustee on account of these wagons at the suit
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-jf the creditor who makes the attachment; nor would its validity be
altered by H.'s having become responsible for the debt, unless R. was
also discharged: Id.
Property exemptcd from Execution-Sale o bV Debtor.-The owner
of property which is exempt from execution in Kentucky has the right
to sell such property at his pleasure, and such sale passes the absolute
title to the purclaser. without rendering the property liable to execution
for the debts of the owner: Anthoiny v. Wade, Ct. of Appeals of Ky.
Such a sale is no fraud upon the creditors of the owner of the pro-
perty, because the property gave no delusive credit to the owner, the
law of exemption being sufficient notice to all creditors that the property
was not subject to their demands: Id.
The exemption laws of Kentucky were passed for the benefit of the
families of housekeepers, and a man who is in good faith a house-
keeper in one county in Keptucky does not lose that character by
removing with his family, and carrying exempted property, from one
county to another in this state: Id.
He does not lose his character as housekeeper by 11 packing up" his
goods for the purpose of removing with his family, and carrying the
exempted property from Kentucky to the state of Tennessee: Id.
Property which is exempted from execution because the owner is a
housekeeper, is also exempt from seizure under execution while in
transitu from one county to another; also while in transitu from Ken-
tucky to Tennessee: id.
EJECTMENT.
Conclusiveness of Single Judgment.-A final judgment pronounced in
an action of ejeetment where the claim of title in fee simple absolute by
the parties respectively was the sole subject of controversy, instituted
and prosecuted under and according to the forms and in the manner
prescribed by the statute laws of the state of Arkansas, that is to say,
by a suit between the real litigants by name and where the land is accu-
rately described, is a valid legal bar to a like action subsequently insti-
tuted between the same parties for the same lands or premises, involving
the same identical title and rights to the possession of such lands or
premises and none other: Sturdy v. Zackaway, 4 Wallace.
Semble. The doctrine is applicable generally in ejectments, in the
form above described, in those states where no provision is made by
statute for a subseouent trial: Id.
EMINENT DoMAIN.
Taking of Land by a Municipal Co poration for Streets.-The legis-
lature have power to pass an act authorizing the mayor and aldermen
of a city to take land for the widening and laying out of a street, and
assess the cost of widening and grading the same, including damages
for land and buildings taken therefor, upon the estates which will abut
on the street after it shall have been laid out and widened, in proportion
to their value at that time; giving to each owner of land ,:o taken, if
aggrieved by the doing-s of the mayor and aldermen, the right of trial
by jury : Dorgqu v. COt;, of Boston. 12 Allen.
In ascertaining the compensation to be paid to an owner of land so
taken, the legislature may provide that the mayor and aldermen shall
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estimate the damages sustained, "including the value of the whole of
the buildings on the land, and part of which shall be so taken, deducting
therefrom, however, the value of the materials and of the buildings, if
any, which will remain ;" that the land shall be estimated at its -value
before the widening, and that such estimate shall not include the in-
creased value occasioned merely by the widening, laying out, and grading,
of the street: Id.
The legislature may also provide, in such case, that the owner of any
estate, a part of which shall be so taken, may, instead of claiming
damages therefor, surrender his whole estate to the city, and that the
mayor and aldermen shall thereupon estimate the value of the whole of
the same, with the buildings, and the owner shall convey the same to
the city, and the city shall pay to him the value so estimated: Id.
EXECUTION.
Death of Party before Fi. Pa. issued.--A writ of fieri facias tested
and issued after the death of the party against whom the judgment is
recovered, is void, and confers no power on the ministerial officer to
execute it: Mitchell v. St. Afaxent's Lessee, 4 Wallace.
The rule applies where the proceedings are commenced by seizing
property under a writ of attachment, under the laws of Florida, as at
the common law: Id.
FACTORS.
Liabiliy to their Principal.-A factor under a del credere commission
becomes liable to his principal when the purchase-money is due. As
between him and his principal, he then, in effect, becomes the pur-
chaser, and is bound to pay not conditionally, but absolutely, in the
first instance: Cartwright et al. v. Green et aL, 47 Barb.
Hence, after the factor has sold the goods, on credit, and sent an
account of sales to his principal, the latter may recover the price of the
goods of the factor, without showing that he has endeavored to collect
the money of the persons to whom the factor sold the goods: Id.
And it is no defence to such an action that thb sale made by the
factor was an incomplete sale, so that, as between the factor and the
purchaser, the former could not have enforced the same, and collected
the money of the purchaser, in consequence of the want of some form-
ality, or memorandum or entry in writing, or actual delivery; where
the factor has, in his correspondence, treated the sale as complete and
binding; has stated and transmitted an account of the net pltoceeds of
the same; has promised to remit the proceeds; and has charged the
purchaser, and credited his principal, in, his books; and the sale has
been recognised and approved by the principal: Id.
- Not a Guarantor of Remittances.-It seems that the contract implied
by a factor acting under a del credere commission does not make him a
guarantor of the rdmittance: 17.
FRAUD.
Upon Creditors.-A covinous note, given to defraud creditors, cannot
be avoided, for the fraud, by the maker, but may, notwithstanding the
fraud, be enforced against him: Carpenter v. McClure, 39 Vt.
The statute of Vermont, so far as it relates to the validity of contracts,
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fraudulent as to creditors, seems to be merely declaratory of the common
law: Id.
Prohibited contracts will not usually be enforced, but in this case the
same statute which impliedly prohibits contracts fraudulent as to cre-
ditors, limits the invalidating effect of the prohibition to the 11 party or
parties only whose right, debt, or duty is attempted to be avoided, their
heirs, executors, or assigns" : Id.
Contracts to defraud creditors are not less prohibited transactions
because not forbidden by the express terms of the statute. The penalty
implies prohibition: Id.
Lux Loci CONTRACTUS.
Interest.-On a consignment of goods by a merchant in New York, to
a factor residing in California, for sale, the contract of the factor is to
be performed in California, by remitting thence the proceeds of the sale,
in the usual way; and in an action brought by the principal, to recover
the proceeds, he is entitled to interest at the rate allowed by the laws
of California: Cartwright et al. v. Greene et al., 47 Barb.
NEGLIGENCE.
Municipal Corporation-Irregularity in establishing the Street no
Defence.-Where a corporation is sued for an injury growing out of
negligence of the corporate authorities, in their care of the streets of the
corporation, they cannot defend themselves on the ground that the
formalities of the statute were not pursued in establishing the street
originally: Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wallace.
If the authorities of a city or town have treated a place as a public
street, taking charge of it., and regulating it as they do other streets,
they cannot when sued for such injury, defend themselves by alleging
want of authority in establishing the street: Id.
OFFIOER OF THE UNITED STATES.
What is a Suit against, vnder Act of Congress of 1833.-An indict-
ment under the Gen. Sts. c. 87, for maintaining a tenement used for the
illegal sale and illegal keeping of intoxicating liquors, by one holding a
license to sell such liquors under the Internal Revenue Law of the
United States, is not a 'Csuit or prosecution against any officer of the
United States or other person for or on account of any act done under
the revenue laws of the United States, or under color thereof, or for or
on account of any right, authority, or title, set up or claimed by such
officer or other person under any such law of the United States," which
can be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for trial,
under the U. S. St. of 1833, c. 57, § 3: Commonwealth v. Casey, 12
Alien.
PARDON.
Before Conviction.-The Constitution of Kentucky invests the go-
vernor with the general power of pardoning all offences against the law,
and he may exercise this power either before or after trial and convic-
tion, and his pardon must be allowed by the courts: Commonwealth v,
Ashlock, Ct. of Appeals of Ky.
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PARTNERSHIP.
Lands held as Partnership Property-Double Partnership-Death
of one Partner.-A. and B. were partners, A. carrying on the business
of the firm in Boston, and B. in New Orleans. A. took in 0. as a
partner in the business carried on in Boston, and A. and B. agreed in,
writing that after a settlement with 0. all the business in Boston should
be settled by the articles of agreement between A. and B. Real estate
was afterwards acquired by A. and C. in Massachusetts and other states,
with partnership funds, and was agreed to be treated as partnership
property. A. died. Held, that the administratrix of his estate could
not maintain a bill in equity to compel C. to sell said real estate as sur-
viving partner, and to account to her directly for the proceeds; but
that B., as surviving partner of the original firm, bad a right to insist
on O.'s accounting with him therefor: Shearer v. Paine and Others,
12 Allen.
PRACTICE.
Pleas-New Trial.-Whatever system of pleading. may be adopted
in a court below, it can hardly justify or require the court to give an
instruction contrary to law; especially where the plea relied on as the
ground for such instruction constitutes no defence to the action, but is
frivolous and would be stricken from the record on motion: United
States v. Dashiel, 4 Wallace.
Where a plea in answer is but notice of special matter by way of
abatement of the amount claimed and so goes to but part of the cause
of action, it cannot be relied on as a plea in bar: Id.
A motion for a new trial is not a waiver of exceptions: d.
Bil of Exeptions.-When a paper which is to constitute a part of a
bill of exceptions is not incorporated into the body of the bill, it must
be annexed to it, or so marked by letter, number, or other means of
* identification mentioned in the bill, as to leave no doubt, when found in
the record, that it is the one referred to in the bill of exceptions, other-
wise it will be disregarded: Leftwitch v. Lecanu, 4 Wallace.
That a copy of a paper is attached to a pleading in the case, which
purports to be the same as the paper, mentioned in the bill of exceptions,
does not make it a part of that bill, nor can this court presume that it
is the same paper read in evidence and excepted to: Id.
PIRO=HITION.
When the Writ may issue.-The writ of prohibition can only be used
to prevent the doing of some act which'is about to be done, and can
never be used as a remedy for acts already completed: United States v.
JHoff-an, 4 Wallace.
Therefore where the court to wlhich the writ should be issued has
already disposed of the case, so that nothing remains which that court
can do, either by way of executing its judgment or otherwise, no prohi-
bition will be granted: -d.
And this is .true, though the final disposition of the case was made
after service on the judge of a rule to show cause why the writ should
not issue, and though other cases of the same character may be pending
in the same court: .d.
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PUBLIC LANDS.
Pre-emption Glimant.-The equity of a pre-emption claimant of land
under the laws of the United States who has complied with the condi-
tions imposed by those laws, obtained his certificate by the payment of
the purchase-money, and retained uninterrupted possession of the pro-
perty, cannot be defeated by one whose entry was subsequent, although
he has fortified his title with a patent; such person having notice suffi-
cient to put him on inquiry as to the interests, legal or equitable, of the
pre-emption claimant: iughes v. Lnited States, 4 Wallace.
A decree dismissing a bill for matters not involving merits is no bar
to a subsequent suit: Id.
A court of equity will set aside a patent of the United States obtained
by mistake or inadvertence of the officers of the land office, on a bill
filed for that purpose by the government, when the patent prima facie
passes the title: Id.
Open, notorious, and exclusive possession of real property by parties
claiming it is sufficient to put other persons upon inquiry as to the inte-
rests, legal or equitable, held by such parties; and if such other persons
neglect to make the inquiry they are not entitled to any greater consi-
deration than if they had made it and had ascertained the actual facts
of the ease: Id.
PUBLIC OFFcE.
Action against.-An action to recover damages for a tort will lie
against a public officer acting by independent authority, and not merely
as an agent, for a violation of a ministerial duty absolute, certain, and
imperative in its nature, imposed upon him by law, and specifically due
to a particular individual, as distinguished from the whole public:
ClarIc v. Miller, 47 Barb.
A highway having been laid out by the commissioners of highways,
through the plaintiff's farm, commissioners appointed by the county
court assessed his damages at $185. On appeal from this assessment, a
jury re-assessed the damages of the plaintiff at $355. The defendant,
being supervisor of the town, was requested by the plaintiff to lay this
last assessment before the board of supervisors, which the defendant
refused to do, claiming that the re-assessment was invalid and illegal-
.el1, that for this refusal to perform a duty imposed upon him by law,
an action could be maintained against the defendant, by the plaintiff, to
recover the damages caused by such refusal: R.
Measure of Damages, in such.an Action.-The measure of damages,
in such an action, is the amount of the assessment which the defendant
refused to lay before the board of supervisors, interest and costs : Id.
SEDUCTION.
Action for.-The action for seduction has its foundation in the rela-
tion of master and servant; and loss of service, or actual injury to the
plaintiff's rights as master, must be averred and proved : Ingersoll v.
Mller, 47 Barb.
Proof necessary.-The action is not maintainable upon the mere rela
tion of parent and child. Proof of seduction, merely, is not sufficient;
but the plaintiff must show that a direct injury to his rights as master
resulted therefrom: Md.
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But proof of the slightest loss of service, or the most trifling injury,
if the direct result of the wrongful act, is sufficient to uphold the
action : id.
When action for, lies.-Mere seduction, without pregnancy, conse-
quent ill health, or injury to the servant, will not give the right of,
action: I1.
But when pregnancy, and consequent incapacity for physical exertion
and endurance, follow from the wrongful act, the technical requirement
of the law in regard to actual loss, or injury to the master's rights, is
met and answered: Id. .
In such a case, sickness and temporary if not permanent derangement
of the system, being the necesgary result, it becomes, as matter of law,
an injury of which the master, as such, may complain: Id.
. It is no objection to the maintenance of the action that no expense,
or actual loss of services to the plaintiff, is proved. It is sufficient that
the father was, at the time, entitled to the services of the .daughter, and
might have required them, had he chosen to do so: Id.
If there has been a wrongful interference with -his right to his
daughter's services, and he could not have obtained them had he
required them, at least not to the same extent as if pregnancy had not
existed, there is a positive injury to the plaintiff's rights, equally avail-
able, as a ground of action, with actual loss of service: Id.
The master has a property in the labor of his servant, and any wrong-
ful act creating or producing a disability in the servant to perform what
the master has a right to require, operates as a disturbance or infringer
ment of such right, to which the law will attach at least- iominal
damages: .d.
The minor daughter of the plaintiff, having been seduced by the
defendant, became pregnant, and died suddenly, about four months
after conception. A post mortem examination disclosed a dead fJotus-
-also a congested brain, caused by nervous excitability or extreme mental
agitation, or both. At the time of the seduction, and until her depease,
the daughter resided with her father, except when employed*as a school-
teacher, under a contract made with him. She was thus employed at
the time of her decease. .ield, that an injury to the plaintiff's rights
was proved, clearly giving him a right of action: Id.
And that the court was right in refusing to dismiss the complaint on
the objection that there was no proof of any loss of services, as a conse-
quence of the seduction: Id.
Damages.-The question of damages, in an action for seduction, is
for the jury; and if they find a verdict for the plaintiff for $5000, the
amount will not be deemed so extravagantly excessive as to imply
partiality, corruption, or undue influence, or authorize the court to
interfere with the verdict: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
.Jurisdiction.-In a case brought here from a state court under the
25th section of the Judiciary Act, the record must show that some one
of the matters mentioned in that section was necessarily decided by the
court, notwithstanding there may be a certificate from the presiding
judge that such matters were drawn in question: Railroad Co. v. Rock,
4 Wallace.
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If it appears from the record that the state court might have decided
the case on some other ground, this court has no jurisdiction: Id.
This court cannot reverse the decision of a state court upon the
general ground, that that court has declared a contract void which this
court may think to be valid: Id.
It must be the constitution or some statute of the state, which impairs
the obligation of the contract, or which is otherwise in bonflict with the
constitution or laws of the United States; and the decision of the state
court must sustain the law of the state in the matter in which this con-
flict is supposed to exist, or the case for this court does not arise: Id.
The jurisdiction of this court to re-examine judgments of the Circuit
Courts, is limited to cases where the matter in dispute exceeds $2000.
Where it but equals that sum the jurisdiction does not exist: Walker
v. United States, 4 Wallace.
SuRP. y.
Discontinuance of Attachment against Principal.-A creditor who
has commenced an action against the principal upon a promissory note,
may discontinue it without prejudice to his rights against the sureties,
although property of the principal may have been attached therein:
Eleazar Barneyt v. Josiah Clark, Sup. Ct. N. H.
In such a case the mere facts that the creditor being the payee of the
note and knowing the relation of its signers, had, before the discontinu-
ance of his action in answer to the inquiry of the principal, informed
him that the note was secured by the attachment, and that the principal
had given this information to the surety, and in consequence of it had
neglected to secure the surety, will not estop the creditor or a subsequent
indorsee of the note from afterwards collecting it of the surety: Id.
Where a payee of the note received of A., who was not a party to
it, its amount, and A. took the note, which was subsequently at his
request indorsed by the payee : Held, that there was evidence of a sale
of the note by the payee to A., although the former did not understand
that he was making a sale at the time when he received the money and
A. first took the note: Id.
TAXATION.
Power of States over Land as a Subject of Taxation.-The different-
states, as a general rule, have the right of determining the manner of
levying and collecting taxes on private property within their limits;
and can declare that a tract of land shall be chargeable with taxes, no
matter who is the owner, or in whose name it is assessed and advertised;
and that an erroneous assessment does not vitiate the sale for taxes:
Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wallace.
Lands originally public cease to be public after they have been
entered at the land office, and a certificate of entry has been ob-
tained: _d.
Lands so entered are liable to taxation; and if the taxes remain
unpaid, they may be sold like other lands, even though no patent may
as yet have issued : Id.
The right of tax attaches as well to donation entries as to cash
entries; the particular land in either case, when the entry is made and
certificate given, being segregated from the mass of public lands. and
becoming private property: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT ]ECISIONS.
TENDER.
If the defendant in offering the money which he claims to have ten-
dered plaintiff, had in substance told plaintiff, that if he took it it must
be in full, the offer would have been conditional and invalid as a tender.
Its acceptance would have amounted to accord and satisfaction: Poster,
v. Drew et al., 39 Vt.
But the language used in making the tender must be interpreted as
it was used with relation to the previous transactions between the par-
ties, to determine correctly whether its effect is to affix- a condition to
the offer, or merely to explain what the defendant claims and intends
that the tender will cover: Td.
The defendant had been offering plaintiff $170, which was due plain-
tiff by reason of a transaction about some oats. The defendant all the
while stated, that if plaintiff took it the plaintiff would still owe the
defendant a store account of $41.78. Finally, the defendant tendered
plaintiff $130 in currency, "and supposed, and told the plaintiff, that if
the plaintiff took the $130, it closed the whole business; ind if he took
the $170, it settled the oat business and left the account standing."
.eld, that the offer of $130"was valid as a tender, and the defendant's
language, instead of affixing a condition to his offer of that sum, merely
explained his claim and what he meant his tender to cover: Id.
TRuST.
Devise to a (,lass with fiower of Selection in the Trustee.-Where a
.will gave to a trustee the residue of testatrix's estate, with directions
to dispose of it for the benefit of her brothers and sister, as he might;
from time to time, judge the testatrix would have done if she could
have foreseen the circumstances, and expressing entire confidence in the
discretion of the trustee-it was held, that a trust was not created for
the benefit of each brother and sister equally; but that the fund
was to be applied for the benefit and comfort of the beneficiaries, at
such times and in'such proportions as the trustee, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, and in view of their respective needs, should judge best
to accord with the purposes of the donor: City of Portsmouth v. Shack-
ford et al., Sup. Ot. N. H.
Held, also, that if there be a gift to one, in trust for a class of per-
sons, with a power of selection, a court of equity will not interfere with
its exercise by the trustee, so long as it is governed by a sound discre-
tion and is in accordance with the will of the testator,-although, if the
trustee die without having exercised this power, the court, in distribu-
ting the fund, will ordinarily be governed by the Statute of Distribu-
tion, unless the provisions of the will indicate a different distribution.
Whether in this case there is an unlimited power of selection, so that
the trustee might Appoint the whole fund to one or more of the brothers
and sister, gucere. Under the provisions of this will, the trustee may,
in his discretion, rightfully expend the entire capital for the benefit of
the brothers and sister: Md.
If those brothers and sister were all in equal need, and other things
were equal, a sound discretion would require an equal distribution of the
fund. Where the income of the fund for one year, being about $240,
was expended by applying to one brother $100, to another $111.51, to
the other nothing, and to the sister, who was wholly destitute and in the
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
almshouse, and also non compos, $24.56: Held, that in respect to the sis-
ter, there was no such abuse of the trustee's discretion, as to cause the
court to interfere: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Whether the Title passes.-The plaintiff agreed, orally, to purchase of
the defendant twenty-three hundred bushels of wheat- then in store in
an elevator, and paid him the price. The wheat was in bulk, mixed
with a larger quantity belonging to the defendant and others, and was
not separated from the mass in store, nor was any manual delivery made,
or bill of sale executed, or order given to the plaintiff on the keeper of
"the elevator. About sixteen hundred bushels were destroyed by fire in
the elevator before it was removed by the plaintiff. The jury having
found that the title did not pass, but that the wheat remained the pro-
perty of the vendor, and at his risk: _ield, that the contract operated
as a contract to sell, and was not a transfer of the title; and that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the wheat remaining unde-
livered at the time of the fire: Rodee v. Wade, 47 Barb.
Speci&c Performance of Contract for Sale of Land.-The granting
of a specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, is not a
matter of right, to which the party is entitled when he has proved his
contract, but is always a matter of sound and reasonable discretion on
the part of the court, in view of all the circumstances of the case:
Eastm cn v. .Plumer et al., Sup. Ct. N. H.
In exercising this sound discretion, the court will not decree a specific
performance, in cases of fraud or mistake, or of a hard and unreasonable
bargain, or in case of great inadequacy or exorbitancy of price, or where
the decree would in any way produce injustice: Id.
Those who desire to secure the aid of equity in enforcing the per-
formance of contracts, must show a willingness and a readiness to per-
form and abide by them: Id.
If either party to a contract of sale, fails or refuses to claim or act
under the contract for such a length of time, as to give the impression
that he has waived or abandoned the sale or purchase, and especially, if
the circumstances justify the belief that his intention was to perform
the contract only in case it suited his interest, he will necessarily forfeit
all claim to equity: Id.
There are many equitable considerations not amounting to illegality
or actual fraud in the contract, which may properly induce a court of
equity to refose to decree a specific performance of the contract, and to
leave the party to his remedy at law for a non-performance, which would
not be sufficient to warrant the court in setting aside the contract of
sale: ld.
There are few cases in which courts of equity will insist on the
maxim, that he who seeks equity must do equity, with more rigor than
in those of suits for specific performance of contracts : Id.
Ordinarily, a party who has once elected to rescind a contract, and
sought to repudiate it and failed, will not afterwards be heard when he
calls on equity to decree specific performance of such contract: Id.
Of Chose in Action-Eqiuities against the Purchaser.-The rule tha;t
a bona fide purchase for value and without notice of prior equities is a
